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Cybercrime and Punishment: The Russian Mafia and
Russian Responsibility to Exercise Due Diligence to
Prevent Trans-boundary Cybercrime
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2013, 110 million consumer accounts were hacked
as a result of a security breach at Target—probably the largest
security breach in U.S. history. 1 It was subsequently disclosed that
the hackers used Russian-made malware to pull off the attack.
Although unconfirmed, many analysts suggested that the Russian
Mafia orchestrated the breach. 2
In Russia, an extremely profitable and professional cybercrime
industry 3 has emerged. Overall, Russian hackers have been
responsible for a disproportionate share of cybercrime. 4 In 2013, the
Russian cybercrime industry made at least $1.9 billion dollars. 5
Russian-speaking countries also contribute significantly to overall
cybercrime. 6 Much of the crime is attributable to organized groups,
such as the Russian Mafia. 7
1. Kacper Pempel, Largest Single Personal Data Hack Ever? 360mn Stolen Account
Credentials Found Online, RT (Mar. 1, 2014 1:31 AM), http://rt.com/news/largest-hackstolen-credentials-287/.
2. See Walter Russell Mead, Russian Mob May be Behind Target Hacking, THE
AMERICAN INTEREST (Jan. 17, 2014 12:20 PM), http://www.the-americaninterest.com/blog/2014/01/17/russian-mob-may-be-behind-target-hacking/.
3. The department of Justice classifies cybercrimes into three categories: (1) Cyber
attacks – crime where the computer system is the target, such as viruses, DoS attacks and other
sabotage or vandalism; (2) Cyber theft – where a computer is used to steal money through
extortion, embezzlement or other means; (3) Other Computer Security Incidents: breaches
such as phishing, adware, or theft of information. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CYBERCRIME
AGAINST BUSINESS, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cb05.pdf. This Comment is primarily concerned with
either cyber attacks or cyber theft as such crimes tend to have significant or substantial
consequences sufficient to trigger the international due diligence obligation.
4. Global Security Report May 2012, GROUP IB, http://www.groupib.com/images/media/global_security_report_201205.pdf.
5. John Casaretto, Report: Russia’s CyberCrime Market Hits $1.9 Billion, SILICONE
ANGLE (Oct. 9, 2013), http://siliconangle.com/blog/2013/10/09/report-russiascybercrime-market-hits-1-9-billion/.
6. Jarrod Rifkind, Cybercrime in Russia, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Jul.
14, 2011), https://csis.org/blog/cybercrime-russia.
7. I will use the phrase Russian Mafia interchangeably with Russian organized crime. For an

177

ORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/18/2015 2:11 PM

2015

The cost of cybercrime is even greater than those statistics
suggest. One study, which included the costs of clean up after an
attack but not the additional costs of lawsuits filed after a breach,
concluded that cybercrime cost $113 billion dollars. 8
The increased prevalence of trans-boundary cybercrime, coupled
with Russia’s unwillingness to aggressively pursue the Russian Mafia
and other cybercriminals, leads to the question of whether Russia has
an international obligation to prevent such crimes. So far, Russia has
refused to sign on to the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber
Crime, in part due to its reluctance to take upon itself an obligation
to cooperate in the investigation of the numerous cyber-attacks
caused by its residents or using its infrastructure. 9 Likewise, because
of the difficulty of establishing direct attribution or complicity,
Russia has thus far not been held accountable for failure to prevent
cyber-attacks such as those that were launched against Estonia in
2007 and 2008 or the ongoing cybercrime carried out by Russian
organized crime. 10
This Comment argues that Russia has an obligation to monitor
and prevent trans-boundary cybercrime under the standard of due
diligence. Due diligence has never been applied directly to
cybercrime, but it is increasingly viewed as a general obligation and
customary expected state conduct. 11 It is a concept deeply rooted in
international law in a wide variety of fields including environmental
law, human rights, and the prevention of crime. Moreover, Russia’s
involvement in such treaties as the Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime [Palermo Convention] implies that Russia has
accepted at least parts of this duty of due diligence. 12

overview of the structure of the Russian Mafia, see JAMES O. FINCKENAUR & YURI A. VORONIN,
THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2001).
8. Willie Jones, How Much Does Cybercrime Cost? $113 Billion, IEEE SPECTRUM (Nov.
22, 2013 23:12 GMT), http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/security/how-muchdoes-cybercrime-cost.
9. Putin Defies Convention on Cybercrime, C NEWS (Mar. 27, 2008 10:04:15),
http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/indexEn.shtml?2008/03/27/293913.
10. Casimir C. Carey III, The International Community Must Hold Russia Accountable
for its Cyber Militias, SMALL WARS J. (Mar. 27, 2013 2:30 AM),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-international-community-must-hold-russiaaccountable-for-its-cyber-militias.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
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Part II of this Comment will look at the inadequacy of
alternative grounds for holding Russia responsible such as direct
attribution or complicity. In Part III, the standard of due diligence
will be discussed in depth. Particular attention will be given to the
question of what standard of due diligence should be enforced in the
cyber context. Russia’s additional treaty obligations under the
Palermo Convention also supplement its obligation under customary
law and will be considered in Part IV. Having established a possible
standard for due diligence, Part V. will then describe the Russian
Mafia and Russia’s efforts to prevent organized cybercrime. In Part
VI., Russia’s efforts will be held up to the standard of due diligence
to show that Russia has fallen short of its due diligence obligation to
prevent trans-boundary cyber-attacks and cybercrime from its
territory. Finally, in Part VII, this Comment will conclude on a
hopeful note by looking at a new Russian proposal that if passed and
fully implemented would likely meet the State’s due diligence
obligation. 13
II. DIFFICULTY OF PROVING DIRECT ATTRIBUTION OR
COMPLICITY FOR CYBERCRIME AND CYBER-ATTACKS
One possible way that Russia could be held accountable for its
failure to prevent trans-boundary cybercrime is through its direct
involvement in the attacks, or through knowing complicity. 14 In
particular, Russia was accused of either being directly responsible
for—or at the very least complicit—in the wide-ranging cyber-attacks
that crippled neighboring Estonia in 2007 and 2008. 15 For instance,
tools used by hackers were stored on government servers and
infrastructure and attacks came from government IP addresses. 16
Scholars have written about the Estonia conflict and debated

14. For an explanation of complicity and its relationship to state responsibility, see
generally, HELMUT PHILIPP AUST, COMPLICITY AND THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(2011). See also Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, In Search of Alternative Solutions: Can the State of
Origin Be Held Internationally Responsible for Investors’ Human Rights Abuses That Are Not
Attributable to It?, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 155, 170–75 (2010).
15. See Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks, RADIO FREE EUROPE (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/Behind_The_Estonia_Cyber-attacks/1505613.html
[hereinafter Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks]; see also Carey, supra note 10.
16. Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks, supra note 15; See also Arthur Bright, Estonia
Accuses Russia of ‘Cyberattack,’ CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (May 17, 2007),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0517/p99s01-duts.html.
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whether Russia was directly responsible or complicit in the attacks
due to the highly sophisticated and coordinated nature of the
attacks. 17 However, the government has strongly denied any
complicity or direct involvement. 18 In the recent conflict with
Ukraine over the Crimea, cyber-attacks and disruptions of services
also coincided with the deployment of troops. 19
Yet, despite some limited evidence of direct involvement or
complicity, Russia is unlikely to be held responsible for direct
involvement or complicity. The standard set out by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) for such a charge is quite difficult to prove. In
the Corfu Channel Case, the seminal case on attribution, the ICJ
rejected a British argument that Albania was responsible through
“acquiescence” and “collusion” for mines that led to the destruction
of British ships. 20 In rejecting this argument, the ICJ suggested that
such a charge of “exceptional gravity” required a “degree of
certainty” that the British had been unable to prove. 21
While some cyber-attacks have been successfully decoded and
tentatively attributed to their sources, 22 such attribution is unlikely
in the wide range of cyber-attacks being carried out from Russia on
an ongoing basis. 23 Determining origin is a time intensive and
inconclusive endeavor as shown by the efforts to decode Stuxnet—
the cyber weapon that was used to sabotage Iran’s nuclear

17. See Stephen Herzog, Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and
Multinational Responses, 4 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY, Summer 2011, 49 (2011).
18. See Nate Anderson, Massive DDoS Attacks Target Estonia; Russia Accused, ARS
TECHNICA (May 14, 2007 6:45 AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/05/massiveddos-attacks-target-estonia-russia-accused/. A member of the Russian Duma allegedly has
stated that one of his aides was responsible for the attack, but the official Russian position has
been to deny any involvement. See Behind the Estonia Cyberattacks, supra note 15.
19. Ukraine Crisis: Ukraine’s Telecommunications Hit by Cyberattacks, REUTERS (Mar.
4, 2014), http://www.straitstimes.com/breaking-news/world/story/ukraine-crisis-ukrainestelecommunications-hit-cyber-attacks-20140304. But see Mark Clayton, Where are the
Cyberattacks? Russia’s Curious Forbearance in Ukraine, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar.
3, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2014/0303/Where-are-thecyber-attacks-Russia-s-curious-forbearance-in-Ukraine.-video.
20. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
21. Id. at 17.
22. See Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts,
Officials Say, WASH. POST (June 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officialssay/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html.
23. Because attacks can originate from machines around the world, pinpointing the
controller or designer of a specific attack is highly imprecise. See Anderson, supra note 18.
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program. 24 Moreover, any government complicity with the Russian
Mafia’s cyber activities is most likely attributable to corruption or
bribed officials rather than official government policy. 25 Thus,
evidence of complicity is likely to be sparse and insufficient. It is
unlikely that such a “degree of certainty” will ever be established
regarding cybercrimes. 26
In addition, even if sufficient evidence existed, liability through
complicity and direct attribution is generally limited in scope because
it would only apply to those cases where complicity or direct
attribution could be proved. 27 In other words, even if the Russian
government’s responsibility for the attacks in Estonia were firmly
established, it would do little to establish a more general state
responsibility for the trans-boundary harm caused by non-state
actors. Therefore, despite some evidence of complicity between the
Mafia and the Russian government, complicity or direct attribution
are unlikely to provide adequate grounds for state liability. This
Comment seeks to establish an alternative and more general basis for
Russian responsibility for trans-boundary cybercrime based on the
principle of due diligence
III. DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
While international law does not impose strict responsibility
upon a state for injuries suffered by a foreign state as a result of its
conduct or the conduct of its citizens, states are generally seen as
responsible for negligent conduct. 28 More specifically, a state is

24. Id. For an in depth look at the painstaking efforts required to decode Stuxnet, see
Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History,
WIRED (July, 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectivesdeciphered-stuxnet/all/1.
25. For a description of Mafia influence and corruption in the judicial system, see infra
Part VI. For an overview of attribution of conduct to a state generally, see U.N. LEGISLATIVE
SERIES, MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL
ACTS,
27–96
(2012),
available
at
http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25_part1_ch2.pdf.
26. For a detailed analysis of various proposed standards of proof for state responsibility,
see Scott J. Shackelford and Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber-attacks:
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971 (2011).
27. See MATERIALS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACTS, supra note 25.
28. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, 508–11 (Sir Robert Jennings QC &
Sir Arthur Watts KCMG QC eds., 9th ed. 2008).
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required to exercise due diligence to prevent citizens or others
residing within its territory from committing trans-boundary harm. 29
It is well established in international law that states are required
to prevent the use of their territory or resources to cause injury to
another state or citizens of another state. 30 For instance, in the Trail
Smelter Arbitration, the United States was damaged by fumes and
industrial pollution emanating from Canadian businesses across the
border. 31 The tribunal concluded that Canada was responsible for the
harm caused by the Trail Smelter because “no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury . . . in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein . . . .” 32 The Trail Smelter Case is considered one of
the primary sources of the enduring doctrine of due diligence. 33
Due diligence is the most commonly applied standard for the
state’s duty to prevent trans-boundary harm. 34 It is a robust standard
with widespread application in various fields of international law. The
next section describes the history and the wide acceptance of the
standard of due diligence. The specific contours of due diligence as
applied to cybercrime will then be developed and elaborated upon.
A. Due diligence is a well-established principle with a strong historical
pedigree
The standard of due diligence has a lengthy historical
pedigree. 35 Due diligence is based on the historic maxim of sic utere
29. Id. at 549.
30. Id.
31. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib. 1941),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf.
32. Id. at 1965.
33. Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law Commission’s Work on
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and State Liability, TRANSBOUNDARY
HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Russell A. Miller ed., 2006) available at
http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/links/chapter8drumbl.pdf.
34. Nevertheless, despite its important role, some have argued that due diligence as a
standard has received inadequate scholarly coverage. See, e.g., Gabe Shawn Varges, Book
Review, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 568 (1991) (reviewing RICARDO PISILLO MAZZESCHI, ‘DUE
DILIGENCE’ E RESPONSABILITÀ INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI (Dott. A. Giuffrè ed., 1989)).
This Comment is an attempt to add to that discourse.
35. One sign of the widespread permanence of the concept of due diligence is that the
English term is commonly used even when the concept is discussed in countries with languages
that have equivalent or analogous terms in the native tongue. See Varges, supra note 34 (for
instance, diligence requise in French and diligenza dovuta in Italian).
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tuo ut alienum non laedas and has its origin in Roman law. 36 Due
diligence was a central concern in early efforts to codify rules of
state responsibility. 37 Even though codification efforts have failed,
there is a general consensus that the obligation of due diligence is
part of the “corpus of general international law.” 38 Despite the lack
of general codification, due diligence has been applied in many
fields, ranging from international environmental law, 39 and efforts
to prevent violence against women, 40 but it applies to all areas of
international law. 41
Likewise, due diligence has played a prominent role in important
international law decisions. An arbitration in 1902 over economic
losses suffered by an Italian citizen in Venezuela held that “if . . . it
is . . . proved that Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due
diligence to prevent damages from being inflicted by revolutionists,
that country should be held responsible. 42 In 1924, after the
assassination of an Italian general and other officials in Greece
(Janina-Corfu affair), a Commission of Jurists appointed by the
League of Nations explained that a state is responsible for harm
committed against foreigners “if the state has neglected to take all
reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime.” 43 The
Commission also recognized a concomitant obligation to pursue
perpetrators and ensure that they are brought to justice.

36. So use your own as not to injure another’s property. See Jutta Brunnée, Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
37. Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
38. Id.
39. A wide range of environmental treaties incorporate the standard of due diligence.
See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE
ENVIRONMENT 147–50 (2009).
40. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, COMM’N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49 (May 14, 2013) (by Rashida Manjoo),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A_HR
C_23_49_English.pdf.
41. Koivurova, supra note 37 (“[I]n international law the concept of due diligence
remains a general principle of law.”).
42. Salvatore Sambiaggio (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 499 (Mixed Claims Comm’n,
1902) (emphasis added).
43. David Jayne Hill, The Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 98 (1924). See also
Quincy Wright, Opinion of Commission of Jurists on Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 AM. J. INT’L L.
536 (1924).
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Other international courts have also invoked the standard of due
diligence. For instance, the ICJ determined in 1979 that the
government of Iran had failed to take “appropriate steps” to protect
the United States consulate, and that its failure “was due to more
than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means.” 44 While the ICJ
did not explicitly mention due diligence, the concept is implicit in
language referring to “appropriate steps.” 45 Likewise, in Nicaragua
v. United States, the ICJ held that Nicaragua would not be held to a
“higher degree of diligence” to control arms traffic than wealthier
nations such as the United States. 46 Implicit in the court’s analysis is
that states do owe some degree of diligence in responding to and
preventing trans-boundary harm.
Thus, the existence of a due diligence obligation to prevent
trans-boundary harm is well attested in customary international law
and international legal precedent. The next section will flesh out the
contours of a state’s due diligence obligation.
B. What duty of care is required under due diligence?
One of the challenges in regard to due diligence is determining
exactly what standard of duty of care is required of states.
Compounding this difficultly is the existence of slightly different
conceptions of due diligence in different fields of international law.
For instance, many of the specific contours of due diligence have
developed in specialized fields such as international environmental
law 47 and human rights law 48 (especially in the effort to prevent
violence against women), and may not always be generally applicable
or widely accepted. Nevertheless, the many references to due

44. U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 63 (May 24).
45. Due diligence is implicit because appropriate steps implies that there is some
minimal degree of conduct required of states. Some have suggested that the absence of the
phrase “due diligence” can be attributed to fact that due diligence serves as a “generic notion”
of responsibility which finds varied expression in different fields of international law.
Tzevelekos, supra note 14. While this Comment attempts to argue that a general standard of
due diligence can be synthesized, this may be why the exact phrase “due diligence” is absent
even when implied.
46. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter the Nicaragua case]. The Nicaragua case will also be
discussed later in the context of factors that impact the degree of diligence demanded of a
state. See infra text accompanying notes 68–69. See also Koivurova, supra note 37.
47. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 39.
48. See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
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diligence in these disparate fields suggest a general standard that can
be applied in the trans-boundary cybercrime context. 49 This section
will explore the standard of due diligence and attempt to synthesize
the various obligations.
In subsection 1, I will consider what kinds of trans-boundary
harm trigger a state’s due diligence obligation. Next, subsection 2
will discuss the degree of care required under the standard of due
diligence. Subsection 3 will look into the specific state obligations,
specifically the duties to prevent, protect, prosecute, and redress. 50
Throughout, specific applicability of these standards in the
cybercrime context will also be considered.
1. Triggers for trans-boundary harm
According to the United Nations’ International Law
Commission (ILC), harmful conduct qualifies as trans-boundary
harm when four criteria are met: First, the activity in question must
be human activity. Second, it must be within the territory or control
of one state. Third, it must give rise to harm or be capable of giving
rise to harm. Fourth, that harm must be to persons or things within
another state. 51
For cybercrime, human activity should be viewed quite broadly.
A broad view of human activity is necessary because of the potential
for self-replicating or spreading viruses or bots. 52 If continuous
human control were required before due diligence applied, state
responsibility would be drastically limited. It would also provide an
exploitable loophole for a state hoping to escape liability. Instead,
cybercrime should qualify as human activity if the programming or
activity has a human origin. This broad definition of human activity
49. Even though a general standard can be synthesized from disparate cases and
references to due diligence, drafting and ratifying a comprehensive convention on cybercrime
would be helpful in solidifying the exact obligations of a state. Thus, the existence of a general
standard should encourage efforts to create specific international agreements and norms. See
Tzevelekos, supra note 14.
50. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, The
Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence against Women, Comm’n on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by Yakin Ertürk).
51. Daniel Barstow Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commission’s
Study of “International Liability”, 80 AM. J. INT’L L., 305, 310 (1986).
52. Stuxnet was a self-replicating virus for instance, and spread far beyond the originally
intended target. See Gary D. Brown, Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack, 63 JOINT
FORCE QUARTERLY 70 (2011).
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is consistent with the ILC’s wording, which was mainly understood
to exclude natural disasters and other acts of nature. 53
In regard to cybercrime, one of the more difficult questions is
whether a cybercrime occurs under the control of a state. For
instance, if a cybercrime originates in territories that are indirectly
controlled by Russia such as Chechnya or Crimea, it is not certain
what degree of control the state has. However, the obligation of due
diligence is incumbent upon each nation regardless of whether that
nation has sufficient control to fully prevent the cybercrimes from
occurring. 54 A state is responsible for doing what is actually within its
power; for instance, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
found Moldova and Russia responsible for its failure to exercise due
diligence “even in the absence of effective control” to prevent an
arbitrary detention. 55 Under the European Convention, Moldova
and Russia had the responsibility to “take the diplomatic, economic,
judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take . . . .” 56 Thus,
the international and diffused nature of cyber activities does not
justify laxity on the part of states. While it may be difficult to
determine the point of origin of an attack, a state is still responsible
for making efforts to prevent trans-boundary harm caused by those
residing in its territory or through its cyber infrastructure.
The ILC’s third criterion is that the conduct must give rise to
harm or be capable of giving rise to harm. The requirement “that
harm must be to persons or things within another state” is an
expansive one. Because harm can be to things, that would include
servers, files, or other hardware damages as a result of a cyber attack.
However, one possible limitation on the scope of what qualifies as
trans-boundary harm might be a requirement that the harm result in
physical consequences. 57 For instance, under the Draft Articles on
Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,
conduct for which states are responsible extends to “any activity which
involves the risk of causing significant transboundary harm through

53. Id.
54. See Tzevelekos, supra note 14, at 225.
55. Ilașcu v. Moldova, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R., 318 at ¶ 331.
56. While Ilașcu focused on human rights violations under the European Convention,
there is nothing in the decision that implies that the principle be limited only to violations of
human rights.
57. See Magraw, supra note 51.
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the physical consequences.” 58 However, as the main focus of the Draft
Articles is environmental harm, such a restriction may not be
appropriate in the cyber context. Nevertheless, even with such a
restriction, a great portion of cybercrime would qualify. It is arguable
that altering code or causing a site to crash as a result of a DDoS
attack 59 has physical consequences. 60 And certainly, a cybercrime that
cripples critical governmental or civilian infrastructure would have
dramatic physical consequences that extend beyond the realm of
economic impact. Additionally, the harm need not be exclusively
trans-boundary or exclusively impact those in another state. 61 Given
the interconnected nature of the cyber economy, a cyber-attack might
have consequences in both the country of origin and the target
country. Such attacks would qualify as causing trans-boundary harm. 62
In addition to the aforementioned requirements, in order for a
state to be responsible for third party trans-boundary harm, the harm
caused must be more than de minimus; the harm must be
“significant.” 63 Significant harm would include harm that is more than
merely “detectible” and could be measured by objective standards
including economic loss. 64 However, for harm to qualify as significant
it need not rise to the level of serious or substantial. 65 Unfortunately,
this distinction has not always been applied consistently. For instance,
the Trail Smelter Arbitration relied on existing U.S. and international
decisions to establish that the harm must be of serious consequence

58. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr.
23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001); U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2008),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_7_2001.pdf.
59. DDoS attacks typically occur when an attack floods a network or website with
information causing an overload that leads to slowdown or a crash. See US-CERT, Security Tip
(ST04–015): Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks (Feb. 06, 2013), https://www.uscert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015.
60. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber
Operations Context, 2012 4TH INT’L CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT (2012), available at
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/5_2_Schmitt_AttackAsATermOfArt.
pdf (arguing that currently manipulation of data does not count as physical consequences to
qualify as an armed attack, but that the proliferation of cyber-attacks might lead the standard
to change).
61. See Magraw, supra note 51.
62. Id.
63. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
A/56/10 International Law Commission (2001), art. 2 commentary (4).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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and be established by clear and convincing evidence. 66 Nevertheless,
cyber-attacks will regularly rise to the level of significant and, because
of the staggering economic costs totaling in the millions or billons,
may rise even to the level of having serious consequences. Certainly,
the economic cost of Russian cyber-attacks on the U.S. rises to the
level of having serious consequences.
2. Reasonableness
Due diligence is a standard of reasonableness, and therefore is
assessed based on the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable
government. 67 Due diligence is an “obligation of conduct rather than
of result.” 68 Thus, in assessing whether a state exercised due
diligence, the focus is on what the state did or did not do to prevent
cybercrime rather than whether its attempts succeeded. 69
A range of factors, such as the degree of effective territorial
control, resources available to a state, and the nature of specific
activities are considered when determining what degree of diligence
is required by a state. 70 In addition, the degree of risk is a vital
consideration, with ultra-hazardous activities requiring a far higher
standard of care and greater state diligence. 71 One historic example
of the interplay of some of these factors is the ICJ’s decision in the
66. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Trail Smelter Arb. Trib.
1941), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf.
67. See Koivurova, supra note 37, at ¶ 16.
68. David Freestone, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 15 AMER. SOC. INT. L.
(March 2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/7/advisoryopinion-seabed-disputes-chamber-international-tribunal-law-sea-#_ednref10.
69. By a focus on efforts rather than results, I mean that a state will be judged based on
whether adequate measures are in place to prevent a type of trans-boundary harm, rather than
on whether those efforts were successful in preventing a particular harm. Thus, if a state has in
place adequate measures to guard against trans-boundary cybercrime, it will not be responsible
if a particular attack occurs despite its diligent efforts to prevent it.
70. The ICJ considered these factors in its decision in the Nicaragua case when it
considered that the United States with its wealth had been unable to stem the flow of arms,
and so it was unreasonable to expect far-less-prosperous Nicaragua to do so. See also supra note
69 and accompanying text.
71. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, U.N. GAOR 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 394 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 148, 154, U. N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (art. 3 cmt. 11), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf.
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Nicaragua case. In that case, the ICJ applied and weighed the
above factors against the risk created by the arms-traffic problem,
and determined that the poorer state of Nicaragua could not be
held responsible for failing to control the arms-traffic problem that
its far-wealthier neighbors in the north could not even control
despite superior resources. 72 The court also noted that Nicaragua
had limited control of the flow of arms by “traditional smugglers”
in Nicaraguan coastal areas and therefore could not expected to
prevent all smuggling. 73
Several other mitigating factors might also limit the degree of
diligence a state is required to exercise. For instance, in the context
of efforts to prevent violence against women, the ECtHR, has
acknowledged some additional factors that play into assessing
whether a state exercised reasonable due diligence. The ECtHR has
suggested that a state’s due-diligence obligation may be constrained
by factors such as the “unpredictability of human conduct and
operational choices which must be made terms of priorities and
resources.” 74 The ECtHR has also acknowledged a great degree of
state discretion within the “margin of appreciation” 75 regarding
appropriate legislative and judicial solutions. 76 Some have suggested
that this test closely resembles the test of proportionality often used
by the ECtHR in other contexts. 77 Thus, an inquiry into due

72. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 154 (June 27); see also Koivurova supra note
37, at ¶ 40.
73. Id. at ¶ 155.
74. Makaratzis v. Greece, App. No. 50385/99, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R.; See also Lee
Hasselbacher, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human
Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 190, at ¶ 39–40 (2010).
75. The notion of a margin of appreciation in the cyber context is worthy of further
exploration. Taken to an extreme, it is a concept that can easily be abused. Certainly, the
concept of a margin of appreciation cannot justify using the excuse of combating cybercrime as
a pretext for censorship or aggressive violations of human rights, such as freedom of expression
or freedom of religion. Nevertheless, when assessing whether a state’s attempts to stop
cybercrime are reasonable, unique national factors should be considered and weighed.
76. See Hasselbacher, supra note 74, at ¶ 36.
77. See Tzevelekos, supra note 14, at 203–04. Tzevelekns discusses the relationship
between the margin of appreciation and the proportionality test in his article. He states that
after the “ court reaches regarding the extent of positive state obligations will undergo one last
test, carried out at the macro, or generic, level of the due diligence principle. The baseline for
this test is that the state has at its disposal the necessary means for providing the measures that
have been considered reasonable in a given case.” Id. at 204. He suggests that the margin of
discretion that comes in depends upon the means of the state and other factors. Id.
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diligence take into account other challenges a state faces as well as
unique efforts that the state adopts to combat trans-boundary harm.
To determine whether a state has acted with due diligence in the
context of cybercrime, one should consider the degree of
technological development in a country (as a measure of wealth),
and the degree to which the state has control over cyber
infrastructure. The seriousness of potential cyber-attacks would also
determine the expected degree of diligence. Accordingly, a state
might be expected to spend much more energy combating cyber
terrorism or large-scale organized activity than sporadic and lessdangerous activities perpetuated by isolated individuals.
Because due diligence relies on a standard of reasonableness, it
has been criticized for providing little guidance on what specific
legislation or actions a state must take; 78 nevertheless, the standard
provides a degree of flexibility that is necessary as states attempt to
combat intricate and complex modern problems. Importantly, the
existence of the standard of due diligence implies that there is a level
of minimally expected diligence by a state. 79 Moreover, a concurrent
implication is that the standard is an evolving one requiring
continuing improvements on the part of states. Indeed, due
diligence has been described as a variable concept that changes over
time and increasingly demands more of states in light of new
scientific or technological knowledge. 80
As states continue to develop technological capabilities, the
standard of diligence for protecting and preventing cyber-attacks and
cybercrime should continue to increase. 81 New scientific or
technological knowledge regarding cyber-weapons should lead to
increased capacity to prevent trans-boundary cybercrime. Over time,
78. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 39. Indeed, due diligence has been accused of being
simply a tautology and not a standard. Yet because the standard is an objective one based on
the conduct of nations, generally, it can best be seen as an effort to “objectivize” fault rather
than merely stating wishful thinking. See Gabe Shawn Varges, ‘Due Diligence’ e Responsabilita
Internazionale Degli Stati by Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 568 (1991)
(attempts to give some “teeth” to the standard of due diligence).
79. Tzevelekos, supra note 14.
80. DONALD K. ANTON ET AL., ADVISORY OPINION ON RESPONSIBILITY AND
LIABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL SEABED MINING (ITLOS CASE NO. 17): INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SEABED DISPUTES CHAMBER (2011), available at
https://www.academia.edu/669708/Advisory_Opinion_on_Responsibility_and_Liability_for
_International_Seabed_Mining_ITLOS_Case_No._17_International_Environmental_Law_in_t
he_Seabed_Disputes_Chamber.
81. Id.
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the standard of care expected of states should increase rather than
decrease as cyber-threats become more sophisticated and dangerous.
As will be discussed further, states have an obligation to continually
improve technological capabilities to respond to cybercrime. 82
3. Specific requirements of conduct
Although states have an obligation to monitor and prevent transboundary harm, many have persuasively argued that there is a
broader obligation to “prevent, protect, prosecute, and redress”
cybercrime. 83 Merely monitoring and preventing is insufficient absent
adequate police action and adequate prosecution to deter subsequent
crime. 84 Likewise, without redress, such as access to civil courts or
other remedial schemes, states fail to remedy the consequences of
trans-boundary harm. 85 For a state to adequately and diligently
respond to trans-boundary harm caused by its citizens, each of these
components should be required. 86
Thus, due diligence can be seen as an affirmative obligation
requiring a state to do more than merely respond to harm already
caused. States must take “preventive measures” or, at the very least,
minimize the impact of trans-boundary harm. 87 Where states are
unable to fully prevent harm, there is still a duty to minimize the risk
of such harm.
Before delving into the specific requirements of state conduct
under due diligence, it is helpful to look at an example of how this

82. See infra text accompanying note 96.
83. Special Rapporteur on the Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences,
Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against
Women, ¶ 29, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006) (by
Yakin Ertürk). The ILC proposed a slightly different but similar framework of four
“compound obligations” to prevent, inform, negotiate, and repair. Given that the ILC was
focused on harmful acts that are not illegal, the absence of a prosecutorial component is
expected. Still, the similarities suggest a general agreement that something more than mere
prevention is required. See Magraw, supra note 51, at 311.
84. See infra Part III.B.3.a–c.
85. See infra Part III.B.3.d.
86. Of course, there is considerable overlap between concepts such as prevention and
protection. Classification of one approach as either preventive or protective is made on the
judgment of the author. As the concept of due diligence is applied holistically, categorization
of any particular measure is not essential.
87. Koivurova, supra note 37; see also Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary
Harm from Hazardous Activities, in Report of the International Law Commission A/56/10,
at 153 (art. 3 cmt. 3) (2001).

191

ORTNER.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/18/2015 2:11 PM

2015

standard has been enforced in other contexts. 88 Hungary violated the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women when it failed to “act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and
for providing compensation.” 89 In reaching its conclusion, the
committee considered three factors: lack of adequate legislation to
ensure prevention of harm, 90 lack of priority given to the prosecution
of violators, 91 and the failure of the state to provide information as to
possible alternative avenues to ensure adequate vindication of legal
rights. 92 In a case involving Brazil, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights similarly found a “general pattern of negligence
and lack of effective action by the state in prosecuting and convicting
aggressors,” as well as general “judicial ineffectiveness.” 93 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has also explained that it could
hold states responsible for failing to punish violators and to provide
victims needed assistance in recovery. 94
Thus, in holding states responsible for failing to exercise due
diligence, courts have looked holistically at each of the four areas. 95
88. As previously mentioned, many of the cases elaborating on what the standard of due
diligence requires in each of these areas arise in the context of state efforts to prevent violence
against women. Others arise in the international environmental context. While all of these
cases are not perfect fits for the cyber context, they provide the framework for a standard of
care that is increasingly becoming customary law.
89. Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under
Article 7, Paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, Rep. on its 32nd Sess., Jan. 10–28, 2005, U.N. Doc. A/60/38 (Part I), at 37 ¶ 9.2
(2005) [hereinafter A.T. v. Hungary]. The case involved a woman who had been physically
abused for a period of four years. Hungarian state law was deemed inadequate to address her
human rights violations.
90. Id. at ¶ 9.3 (“[T]he Committee notes that the State party [Hungary] has
admitted . . . that legal and institutional arrangements in the State party are not yet ready to
ensure the internationally expected, coordinated, comprehensive and effective protection and
support for the victims of domestic violence.”). Note that the committee reached this
conclusion even though pending legislation might have changed the situation.
91. Id. (“The Committee further notes the State party’s general assessment that
domestic violence cases as such do not enjoy high priority in court proceedings.”).
92. Id.
93. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 56 (2001).
94. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Decisions and Judgments, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 176 (July 29, 1988).
95. In doing so, I hope to provide an overview and bring together disparate extant
strands of analysis. Such an effort is necessarily not comprehensive. Each of these areas
deserves more extensive analysis than can be accomplished in this Comment.
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a. Prevent
One of the most significant requirements of prevention is the
responsibility to adopt laws and policies appropriate for ensuring
compliance. 96 It is insufficient for a state to disclaim responsibility by
relying on inadequate existing domestic laws. 97 As mentioned, in the
Hungary case, the lack of “specific legislation” to combat the harm
was seen as deeply problematic. The state was liable for the lack of
laws even though it “instituted a comprehensive action programme
against domestic violence” and a wide range of pending legislation to
deal with the problem. 98 Moreover, as the Hungary example
illustrates, generic criminal laws may also be inadequate. Thus, a
state is required to put in “place effective criminal-law provisions to
deter the commission of offenses.” 99
Likewise, in its advisory opinion on Responsibility and Liability for
International Seabed Mining, the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea provided three principles underlying obligations to prevent
trans-boundary environmental harm which can also serve (with some
modification) as principles for preventing against trans-boundary
cyber-attacks and cybercrime: a precautionary approach, best
[environmental] practices, and [environmental] impact assessments. 100
A precautionary approach implies a proactive approach to
preventing trans-boundary harm. 101 States cannot rely on uncertainty
to fail to take necessary steps. Instead, states should act upon
“plausible indications of potential risk.” 102 Best practices would
96. U.S. v. Gr. Brit., 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 125–34 (1871), available at
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIX/125-134.pdf.
97. A.T. v. Hungary, supra, note 89.
98. Id.
99. Osman v. U.K. App. No. 23452/94, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R.. See also Hasselbacher,
supra, note 74; Tzevelekos, supra note 14.
100. Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to
Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion (Feb. 1, 2011), available at
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf.
Other obligations listed in the opinion are less relevant in the cyber context or specific to the
Law of the Sea: “the obligation to assist the Authority in the exercise of control over activities
in the Area” “the obligation to take measures to ensure the provision of guarantees in the
event of an emergency order by the Authority for protection of the marine environment,” and
“the obligation to ensure the availability of recourse for compensation in respect of damage
caused by pollution.” Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 131.
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require states to use the “best technology available” in developing
and implementing protocols to prevent cyber-attacks and
cybercrime. 103 Impact assessment would require that a state consider
the impacts of its cyber policies and internet policies on the
proliferation of cybercrime and cyber-attacks. States should also
regularly evaluate their progress in preventing cybercrimes. Each of
these should be a component of a state’s efforts to prevent transboundary cybercrime.
Finally, some additional requirements for preventing transboundary cyber harm might include promoting research and data
collection to understand the scope of the problem, and drawing up
action plans. 104
b. Protect
Due diligence requires not merely the adoption of laws, but also
“a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement.” 105 Even adequate
legislation is insufficient if not “backed up by law-enforcement
machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of
breaches of such provisions.” 106
States are also required to ensure that sufficient institutional
capacity exists to diligently respond to alleged crimes and effectively
monitor for trans-boundary harm. In order to do so, adequate
training is required to ensure that law enforcement personnel are
equipped to respond to violations of the law. 107 In the cybercrime
context, this might involve ensuring that there are individuals in
various governmental agencies with the adequate technological
training. This would also include conducting official investigations in
response to alleged violations. 108
Another component of both prevention and protection would
involve co-operation with other states in response to acts causing
trans-boundary harm. In the Pulp Mills judgment, a dispute between
Argentina and Uruguay over construction on the Uruguay River, the
103. Id.
104. UNECE, Convention of the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Volume
2105, I-36605 Annex IV. 4, available at http://www2.unitar.org/cwm/publications/cbl/syn
ergy/pdf/cat3/unece/trans_effect_ind_accidents/convention_trans_ind_en.pdf.
105. Pulp Mills Case (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶197 (April 20).
106. R.R. v. Hungary, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001 at ¶ 28 (2012).
107. Id.
108. M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R. 651 at ¶¶ 148–66.
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ICJ explained that cooperation between the parties was “necessary in
order to fulfill the obligation of prevention.” 109 The Draft Articles on
Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities
explains this obligation as follows: “States concerned shall cooperate
in good faith and, as necessary, seek the assistance of one or more
competent international organizations in preventing significant
trans-boundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk
thereof.” 110 Likewise, regarding international co-operation, the
Palermo Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, to which
Russia is a signatory, requires states to provide each other “the
widest measure of mutual legal assistance.” 111 States are also
forbidden from refusing to provide such assistance on the ground
that an offense merely “involve[s] fiscal matters.” 112
c. Prosecute
States are obligated to make prosecution of trans-boundary
crimes a priority. In the aforementioned Hungary case, the court
found Hungary in violation of its due diligence obligation in part
because prosecutions of violence against women did “not enjoy high
priority in court proceedings.” 113 Commentary on the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea emphasizes that due
diligence imposes on states a positive obligation to ensure that their
legal system adequately forbids and punishes prohibited conduct. 114
The prosecution of crimes should provide sufficient deterrence to
help prevent additional violations. 115

109. Pulp Mills Case (Arg. V. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶102 (April 20).
110. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, [with
commentary], in Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 148–70, U.N. DOC. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
111. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the
Protocols Thereto [hereinafter Palermo Convention], art. 18, 2004, available at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/
TOCebook-e.pdf.
112. Id. at art. 16 sub. 15.
113. A.T. v. Hungary, supra note 89, at ¶ 9.3.
114. David Freestone, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on ‘Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons
and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area,’ AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT’L LAW (March
2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/7/advisory-opinionseabed-disputes-chamber-international-tribunal-law-sea-#_ednref10.
115. See Osman v. U.K., supra note 99.
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In evaluating whether prosecutions are adequate, the overall
pattern of prosecutions should be considered. It is insufficient to
occasionally prosecute violators; what is needed is sustained and
regular enforcement and prosecution. For instance, with Brazil, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that the
“general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action by the
state in prosecuting and convicting aggressors [of violence against
women],” as well as general “judicial ineffectiveness,” constituted a
violation of the state’s obligation. 116
Another component of prosecutions of cybercrimes should
involve developing protocols for extradition of criminals. Extradition
and cooperation in prosecution have been integral to international
efforts at combating cybercrime. 117 Some have argued that states are
obligated by customary international law to either prosecute or
extradite criminals. Zdzislaw Galicki, a member of the United
Nations International Law Commission has described this as “a right
recognized in international law and even considered by some jurists
as jus cogens”. 118 Thus, states should make a good faith effort to
cooperate with the extradition of suspected cybercriminals.
d. Redress
States are also required to assist victims of trans-boundary harm.
Of all of the state responsibilities outlined, the responsibility to
provide redress is the least well-defined as a matter of customary law.
In most circumstances, redress is determined based on specific
agreements narrowly tailored to certain kinds of trans-boundary

116. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Rept. No. 54/01,
¶ 56, (1998).
117. See Andy Greenberg, Cybercops Without Borders, FORBES (June 1, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/01/cyberbusts-security-internet-technology-securitycyberbusts.html; Mark Clayton, Hacker’s Extradition for Cyber Heist: Sign U.S. is Gaining in
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(Aug.
11,
2010),
Cyber
Crime
Fight,
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0811/Hacker-s-extradition-for-cyber-heistsign-US-is-gaining-in-cyber-crime-fight.
118. Zdzislaw Galicki, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (“aut dedere aut judicare”)
in
International
Law:
Preliminary
Remarks
(2004),
available
at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2004/english/annex.pdf; See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE (AUT
DEDERE
AUT
JUDICARE
(2009),
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR40/001/2009/en/a4761626-f20a-11dd-855f392123cb5f06/ior400012009en.pdf
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harm. 119 However, there are ongoing efforts to develop articles on
state liability for damages to supplement the ILC’s articles on State
Responsibility, 120 and scholars have attempted to elaborate on state
responsibility to offer redress. 121
Some have suggested that states can fulfill their responsibility to
provide redress in numerous ways. A state could follow a minimalist
“access to justice” approach, 122 which would allow non-state actors full
access to courts and the recourse of national laws. 123 The courts would
have to have “necessary jurisdiction and competence.” 124 The civil law
of a state should allow victims to sue and recover damages. 125
Alternatively, a state could offer a “compensation approach” to
providing redress by offering direct aid to those that suffer as a result
of trans-boundary harm. 126 This compensation could take on a
variety of different forms. For instance, the Draft Principles on the
Allocation of Loss suggests that states could require the
establishment of “industry-wide funds at the national level.” 127 Other
forms of compensation might rely on public or private insurance. 128
Regardless of the approach taken, the non-discrimination
principle would govern all efforts to provide redress. 129 States would
be required to offer the same level of assistance in helping transboundary victims as they do to their own nationals. The Draft
Principles on the Allocation of Loss also suggest that international

119. Worku Damena Yifru, Kathryn Garforth & Paola Sacrone, Review of Issues,
Instruments and Practices Relevant to Liability and Redress for Damage Resulting from
Transboundary Movement of Living Modified Organisms, SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION
ON
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY
(2012),
available
at
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_technicalseries/cpb-ts-03-en.pdf.
120. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the case of Transboundary Harm Arising
out of Hazardous Activities [hereinafter Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss], UN General
Assembly Resolution 61/36 ANNEX, UN DOC. A/RES/61/36 (18 Dec. 2006).
121. A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and
International Law, 17 J. ENV. L. 3 (2005); see also Caroline Foster, The ILC Draft Principles
on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous
Activities, 14 RECIEL (3) (2005).
122. Boyle, supra note 121, at 9.
123. Id.
124. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, supra note 120.
125. Id.
126. Boyle, supra note 121.
127. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, supra note 120.
128. Id. at Principle 4.
129. Boyle, supra note 121.
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cooperation should be an integral component of redress efforts. 130
The state is expected to “consult with and seek the cooperation of all
States affected or likely to be affected to mitigate the effects of
transboundary damage.” 131
In addition, redress should be “prompt and adequate.” The ILC
in its comment on the Draft Principles of the Allocation of Loss
based this standard on the Trail Smelter decision arguing that “the
basic principle established in that case entailed a duty of a State to
ensure payment of prompt and adequate compensation for any
transboundary damage.” 132 In the accompanying commentary, this
standard was elaborated upon to mean compensation that is
“predictable, equitable, expeditious and cost effective.” 133 While
there is ongoing debate as to whether this is a “soft law” principle,
or an obligatory element, 134 it is at the very least an emerging
international norm. 135
In the cyber-law context, under an access of justice approach
states would be required to allow for either effective civil litigation
against those that perpetuate cyber-attacks or offer direct
compensation as part of criminal prosecution. A compensation
approach could take on a variety of forms. A state might help to
rebuild or repair sites that are taken down by cyber-attacks. States
might also offer compensation for time that a site is down as a result
of cyber-attacks or other forms of economic redress. Either of these
approaches, if undertaken with adequate diligence, could meet a
state’s international obligation to provide redress.
IV. RUSSIA AS A PARTY TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
In addition to Russia’s basic obligation of due diligence, Russia is
a signatory to international agreements that further solidify its
responsibility to combat organized cybercrime. 136 In May 2004, Russia
130. Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss, supra note 120, at Principle 6.
131. Id. at Principle 5.
132. Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Sixth Session, 197 (May–Aug. 2004).
133. Id. at 185.
134. The ILC suggests that compensation might be obligatory (“the basic principle
established in that case entailed a duty of state to ensure payment of prompt and adequate
compensation for any transboundary damage.”). Id. at 197.
135. Boyle, supra note 121, at 17.
136. Committee of Experts on Terrorism, Cyberterrorism – The Use of the Internet for
Terrorist
Purposes,
Russian
Federation
(Oct.
2007),
available
at
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Source/cyberterrorism/Russian%20Federation.pdf.
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signed on to the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (also called the Palermo convention because it was
signed in Palermo, Italy). 137 Signatories committed to create laws
necessary to criminalize and punish not just illegal criminal activities of
organized groups, but also conspiracies in such organized groups. 138
The convention also requires states to ensure that bribery and
corruption are adequately punished and to “adopt legislative,
administrative, or other effective measures to promote integrity and to
prevent, detect, and punish the corruption of public officials.” 139
Article 13 of the convention also requires states to cooperate to
prevent trans-boundary criminal activity and to respond by taking
measures to “identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime,
property, equipment or other instrumentalities . . . .” 140 Signatory
states are also bound to provide each other with “the widest measure
of mutual legal assistance,” and states cannot refuse to provide such
assistance on the ground that an offense merely “involve[s] fiscal
matters.” 141 Another relevant provision requires states to take measures
to encourage those that have participated in the criminal activities of
organized groups to cooperate with the authorities. 142
On the other hand, Russia has refused to sign the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention).
Publically, Russia has justified its objections by pointing to provisions
of the convention dealing with unilateral trans-border access of
computer data, which it claims would violate its sovereignty. 143
However, some have argued that Russia’s refusal to sign really stems

137. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, (Status as of
June
12,
2014).
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII12&chapter=18&lang=en. The Palermo Convention defines “Organized criminal group” as “a
structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert
with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit[.]” Palermo Convention, supra note 111, at Article 2, (a).
138. Palermo Convention, supra note 111, at Article 6(1)(b)(ii).
139. Id. at Article 9(1).
140. Id. at Article 13(2).
141. Id. at Article 18(1).
142. Id. at Article 26.
143. Maria Lewytzkyj, Tactics in Cybersecurity: Russia & US – Don’t Forget the Council of
(July
1,
2009),
Europe
Cyber-Crime
Convention,
EXAMINER.COM
http://www.examiner.com/article/tactics-cybersecurity-russia-us-don-t-forget-the-council-ofeurope-cyber-crime-convention.
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from an unwillingness to take upon itself “an obligation to assist
other nations in cybercrime investigations given the numerous cyberattacks that emanate from Russia.” 144
Russia’s alternative proposal instead focuses on restricting
internet conduct “aimed at undermining the political, economic, and
social system of another government.” 145 However, Russia’s proposal
does not create any rules governing state responsibility to prevent
and respond to cyber-attacks. Russian efforts have also been
criticized for their focus on suppressing the free flow of information
and resorting to excessive censorship. 146
Despite Russia’s refusal to sign on to the Budapest convention,
the Palermo Convention still obligates Russia to work diligently to
eradicate organized crime and associated corruption, which
coincidently includes cybercrime.
V. RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE MAFIA AND CYBERCRIME:
HALTING SUCCESS AMIDST FAILURE
In Russia, organized crime has long proliferated. While Russia has
made great strides in combating the Mafia in some areas, the
government’s efforts seem to have led the Mafia to more heavily involve
itself in cybercrime and particularly trans-boundary cybercrime.147
The factors contributing to the growth of the Mafia have been
thoroughly studied. 148 In the late 1980s and 1990s, government
efforts to transition to a market economy without a legal structure
144. Michael A. Vatis, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, in PROCEEDINGS
Research Council ed., 2010).
145. See Daniel Kennedy, Deciphering Russia: Russia’s Perspectives on Internet Policy and
Governance, GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL 9–10 (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.gpdigital.org/wp-content/uploads/pubs/FINAL%20-%20Deciphering%20Russia.pdf.
146. Avner Levin, Securing Cyberspace: A Comparative Review of Stratagies Worldwide,
ROGERS
SCH.
OF
MGMT.
RYERSON
U.
36
(July
2012),
TED
http://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/tedrogersschool/privacy/documents/Ryerson_cyber_
crime_final_report.pdf.
147. For an overview of the Mafia’s shift from violent crime to blue-collar crime, see
generally Vsevolod Sokolov, From Guns to Briefcases: The Evolution of Russian Organized
Crime, 21 WORLD POL’Y J. 68, 72 (2004). See also Dan Kaplan, Russian Cyber Crime Market
More Organized, Lucrative, SC MAGAZINE (April 24, 2012), available at
http://www.scmagazine.com/russian-cyber-crime-market-more-organizedlucrative/article/238100/ (describing the shift from a disorganized cyber crime underground
to an organized and professionalized endeavor led by the Russian Mafia).
148. See, e.g., Sokolov, supra note 147; see also James Ruth, The Russian Mob: Organized Crime in a
Fledgling Democracy, AUBURN U., http://www.auburn.edu/~mitrege/FLRU2520/RussianOrganizedCri
me.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS 207, 218 (Nat’l
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ready to enforce “transparency, accountability, and shareholders’
rights” proved fertile grounds for the growth of illicit activities. 149
Poverty and unemployment led many to become involved in
organized crime organizations. 150 Corrupt police officers accepted
bribes and “looked the other way” as the Mafia engaged in criminal
activity without fear of punishment. 151 Judicial prosecutions failed to
target high-level mafia officials, and even when small-time criminals
were prosecuted, these criminals rarely faced jail time. 152 The Mafia
also manipulated the judicial system by various means such as
bringing prosecutions in order to sabotage business competitors. 153
Indeed, the legal situation in Russia has been described as “legal
nihilism.” 154 In fact, in 2008, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged
that fighting against corruption was “the most wearying and difficult
(problem) to resolve.” 155
While Russia has spoken about the importance of combating
“legal nihilism,” its rhetoric has mostly been followed by inaction. 156
Indeed, despite rhetoric opposing the actions of organized groups,
the Russian Government has been accused of using organized crime
to do “whatever the government of Russia cannot acceptably do as a
government[,]” including criminal operations such as arms
trafficking. 157 Some have even suggested that Russia is virtually a
“mafia state.” 158

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. See also Williams infra note 225 and accompanying text.
153. Thomas Firestone, Armed Injustice: Abuse of the Law and Complex Crime in PostSoviet Russia, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 555, 571 (2009–2010).
154. E. K. Matevosova, Legal Nihilism in Russia and Its Causes, 2011 CURRENT ISSUES
RUSS. L. 22 (2011); see also Kathryn Hendley, Who are the Legal Nihlists in Russia?, 28 POSTSOVIET AFF. 149 (2012).
155. Vladimir Putin, President of Russ., Remarks at Annual Big Press Conference (Feb.
14, 2008) (transcript available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/14/101
1_type82915_160266.shtml).
156. John Barham, Russia’s Cybercrime Haven, SECURITY MGMT. (Nov. 1, 2008),
https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Russias-Cybercrime-Haven.aspx.
157. Luke Harding, WikiLeaks Cables: Russian Government ‘Using Mafia for its Dirty
(Dec.
1,
2010),
Work’,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cable-spain-russian-mafia.
158. Russia is Virtual ‘Mafia State,’ Says Spanish Investigator, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2,
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/247712.
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Despite these problems, some positive steps have been taken,
including efforts to root out corruption in the police force. 159
Likewise, state efforts to stop money laundering by organized crime
have been seen as very successful. 160 Russia has also enacted several
strong laws targeting corruption and money laundering, 161 and
prosecuted thousands of cases of corruption. 162 One leading study
also suggested that the so-called “bribe tax” declined between 2002
and 2005, 163 but the results have been mixed, as other studies
suggest a steady growth in bribes that exceeds the rate of inflation. 164
Yet, other studies have measured an increase of overall corruption. 165
And regardless, it is nearly impossible to overstate how pervasive
corruption continues to be, 166 and Russian citizens continue to
159. Government Flexes Legal Muscle in Corruption in Russia Fight, THINK RUSSIA (June
17, 2010), http://www.thinkrussia.com/policy-initiatives/government-flexes-legal-musclecorruption-russia-fight.
160. See Anti Money-Laundering Law is Enacted in Russia, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
TAX AND LEGAL FLASH REPORT (July 2013), available at http://www.pwc.ru/en/taxconsulting-services/legislation/assets/tax-flash-report-issue-24-342-eng.pdf; but see Alexandra
V. Orlova, Russia’s Anti-Money Laundering Regime: Law Enforcement Tool or Instrument of
Domestic Control?, 11 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 210 (2008).
161. See William D. Semins & Denise N. Yasinow, Russia Amends Anti-Corruption Law to
Require Affirmative Anti-Corruption Compliance Measures, K & L GATES (May 8, 2013),
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/6e522369-093b-4d2d-bc07005d0fbb0860/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3ca1d514-2937-4523-bda103388b86bbec/Government_Enforcement_Alert_05022013.pdf.
162. In the first ten months of 2007 alone, 8,500 officials were charged and over 37,000
cases of corruption were uncovered. 8,500 Russians Charged with Corruption: Official,
EDMONTON J. (Nov. 22, 2007), at A4, http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=d0c04854743d-4f1e-8337-e7011423a2ab.
163. Michael Alexeev & Robert Conrad, Assessment of Tax Reform Results in Russia:
Comparative Analysis 11 (Gaidar Inst. for Econ. Policy, Working Paper No. 0001, 2009),
available at http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/wpaper/0001Alexeev-Conrad.pdf.
164. See Alexandra Kalinina, Corruption in Russia as a Business, INSTITUTE OF MODERN
RUSSIA (Jan. 2013), http://imrussia.org/en/society/376-corruption-in-russia-as-a-business.
In addition, a team from the World Bank recently noted that those companies that are required
to pay a bribe are increasingly expected to pay more. WORLD BANK, POLICY NOTE: RUSSIAN
FEDERATION: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS IN REGULATORY BURDEN AND
CORRUPTION
5
(Feb.
2013),
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/Russia-RegionalBEEPS-2013.pdf.
165. Terry Miller et al., Index of Economic Freedom: Russia, HERITAGE FOUND. 365–66
(2014), http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/countries/russia.pdf.
166. PHILIP GOUNEV & TIHOMIR BEZLOV, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY,
EXAMINING THE LINKS BETWEEN ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION 303–04 (2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/study_on_links_between_organised_crime_and_corruption_en.pdf.
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express pessimism at the possibility of stopping corruption. 167 Thus,
there have been some encouraging steps, but corruption remains an
immense problem.
Moreover, the government’s increased efforts to stamp out money
laundering and other lucrative efforts of criminal enterprise have
forced Russian organized crime to adopt new methods and tactics. 168
Cybercrime seems to be one of the new enterprises that have replaced
traditional Mafia activities. Russian cybercrime activities have evolved
into some of the most complex in the world and malware produced by
former soviet countries, including Russia, has “been dubbed the
‘Faberge Egg[]’ of the malware world,” due to its elegance and
sophistication. 169 Russia has failed to take action to shut down
cybercrime groups, even amidst public attention and pressure. For
example, the Russian Business Network (RBN), a group engaged in a
multitude of cybercrimes, including child pornography and identity
theft, was shut down only after international internet service providers
began to aggressively pursue them. 170 There have been a couple
instances of the Russian authorities arresting cybercriminals, but these
cases have led to limited jail time and are unlikely to serve as an
adequate deterrent to criminals. 171
As the next section will show, Russia has made some limited
progress in recent years. However, its current efforts fall far short of
what would be expected of it under the standard of due diligence.

167. Ivan Nechepurenko, Russians Lose Hope that State Can Tackle Corruption,
Transparency Says, MOSCOW TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news
/article/russians-lose-hope-that-state-can-tackle-corruption-transparency-says/482941.html.
168. Sokolov, supra note 147.
169. Tom Kellermann, Peter the Great Versus Sun Tzu, TREND MICRO (Sept. 2012),
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/spotlightarticles/op_kellermann_peter-the-great-vs-sun-tzu.pdf (discussing differences between Russian
and Chinese cybercrime groups).
170. John Barham, Russian Cybercrooks Adopt Lower Profile, SECURITY MGMT. (Apr. 1,
2008), available at https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Russian-Cybercrooks-Adopt-LowerProfile.aspx. Russia was repeatedly asked to coordinate in the fight against the RBN and
refused to do so. See Brian Krebs, Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as Conduit for Cybercrime,
POST
(Oct.
13,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASHINGTON
dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/AR2007101202461.html?sid=ST2007101202661.
171. Robert Lipovsky et al., Cybercrime in Russia: Trends and Issues, ESET (2011),
http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/CARO_2011.pdf.
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VI. RUSSIA IS FALLING FAR SHORT OF ITS DUE DILIGENCE
OBLIGATIONS
Russia has taken some positive steps to combat cybercrime.
However, its current efforts still fall short of the international
requirements of due diligence. The following sections will examine
Russia’s failure to fulfill the specific component of due diligence.
First, Russian cybercrime causes trans-boundary cybercrime. Second,
Russia should be held to a high level of due diligence. Third, Russia
has fallen short of its due diligence obligation to prevent, protect,
prosecute, and redress cybercrime.
A. Russian Cybercrime Causes Trans-boundary Harm
Much of the cybercrime occurring in Russia clearly meets the
international standard for trans-boundary harm.172 First, cybercrime is
clearly a result of human activity. Second, the Russian cybercrime
groups are primarily utilizing Russian cyber-infrastructure including IP
addresses to launch cyber-attacks.173 Thus, Russia is expected to exercise
due diligence to monitor and prevent these trans-boundary activities.
Additionally, the activities of cybercriminals and the Russian
Mafia are clearly capable of giving rise to harm. With an economic
toll of hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars annually, it is
clear that on the aggregate these crimes rise to the level of
“significant” or even “serious” harm. And a significant portion of
the cybercrime emanating from Russia could also be classified as
having physical consequences. 174 Finally, a significant portion of the
harm caused by the Russian Mafia impacts individuals or objects,
such as computers or computer networks, located in other
countries. 175 Thus, the harm caused by the Russian Mafia and
Russian organized crime rises to the level of trans-boundary harm
and is sufficient to trigger Russia’s obligation to exercise due
diligence in preventing, protecting against, prosecuting, and
redressing transnational cybercrime.

172. See Ilașcu v. Moldova, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R., 318 at ¶ 331.
173. For instance, all of the cyber attacks against Georgia were traced to Russian-based
servers. See Tom Espiner, Georga Accuses Russia of Coordinated Cyberattack, CNET (Aug.
2008), http://www.cnet.com/news/georgia-accuses-russia-of-coordinated-cyberattack/.
174. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
175. See Casaretto, supra note 5.
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B. The Degree of Diligence Expected of Russia
The next question is in regard to the level of reasonableness or
diligence to be expected of Russia. There is a strong case to be made
that Russia should be held to a very high level of due diligence in
regard to organized cybercrime.
First, Russia has large financial resources and has shown a
capacity to engage in projects of a large scale. 176 Second, in terms of
technological resources, Russia is considered one of the most
technologically advanced countries in the world. 177 Among similarly
situated members of BRICS, 178 Russia has been ranked as having far
greater technological development. 179 Russia is also notorious for
having some of the most advanced military technology, 180 and has
even utilized hacking and other cyber activities in warfare. 181 Thus,
Russia is technologically well situated to wage a vigorous effort
against cybercrime.
Moreover, the Russian federal government has under presidents
Putin and Medvedev increasingly centralized power. 182 This includes
176. For instance, in 2014, the country hosted the most expensive Olympic games of all
time. Although of course, the resources needed to engage in a protracted conflict against cyber
criminals is different than those needed to build an Olympic stadium. Adam Taylor, Why Sochi Is
By Far the Most Expensive Olympics Ever, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 17. 2014),
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-sochi-is-by-far-the-most-expensive-olympics-ever-2014-1.
177. Kenneth Rapoza, Russia’s High Tech Promise, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/08/22/russias-high-tech-promise/; Andrew
E. Kramer, Russia Takes Big Step into Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/business/global/26ruble.html?_r=0.
178. The term BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China and was coined by
economist Jim O’Neill. See Information about BRICS, BRICS, available at
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/about-brics/information-about-brics (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
179. Joshua Keating, The Most Wired Country in the World is . . ., FOREIGN POL’Y, (Apr. 12,
2013) , available at http://ideas.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/12/the_most_wired_count
ry_in_the_world_is.
180. Mark Galeotti, Russia’s Shiny New Toys, OPEN DEMOCRACY, (Jan. 10, 2014), available
at
http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/mark-galeotti/russia%E2%80%99s-shiny-newweapons; Russian Military Hardware Best in the World, PRAVDA, Dec. 19, 2012,
http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/19-12-2012/123231-russia_military_hardware-0/.
181. See Isaac R. Porche III, Cyberwarfare Goes Wireless, U.S. NEWS (April 4, 2014),
available at, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/04/04/russiahacks-a-us-drone-in-crimea-as-cyberwarfare-has-gone-wireless.
182. Paul Goble, New Regional Policy Draft Pushing Russia Toward Hyper-Centralized
INTERPRETER,
(June
1,
2015)
‘Post-Federalism,’
Shtepa
Says,
THE
http://www.interpretermag.com/new-regional-policy-draft-pushing-russia-toward-hypercentralized-post-federalism-shtepa-says/; Peter Baker, Putin Moves to Centralize Authority,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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state control of television and radio stations with President Putin
recently dissolving one of the main state news agencies in order to
create a television network focused on promoting a positive image of
Russia. 183 The Russian government has also heavily censored the
internet and prosecuted journalists and bloggers for publishing
“extremist” material. 184 Russia’s efforts to censor and suppress
extremist literature and block websites critical of the government
evidence a great capacity to control and regulate internet activity. 185
Despite the margin of appreciation that is granted to states in
attempting to institute unique policies and respond to state specific
challenges, 186 Russia’s attempts to censor internet speech and
discourse cannot be credited as an effort to control cybercrime. As I
have argued elsewhere, Russia’s laws are or should be considered a
violation of the European Convention of Human Rights and a
violation of both Freedom of Expression and Freedom of
Conscience. 187 Moreover, there is evidence of cyber-attacks
(possibility state sponsored) being used as a tool to suppress
opposition voices on the internet. 188 Thus, Russia’s speechsuppressing policies actually lead to the proliferation rather than the
cessation of cybercrime and cyber-attacks.
The seriousness of cybercrime being committed by Russians
would require Russia to exercise a great degree of diligence. The
economic harm caused by the cyber-attacks is significant, but other
dyn/articles/A17838-2004Sep13.html.
183. Timothy Heritage, Putin Dissolves State News Agency, Tightens Grip on Russia
Media, REUTERS, (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/09
/us-russia-media-idUSBRE9B80I120131209.
184. See Draft Articles, supra note 110.
185. RIA NOVOSTI, Russian Media is Instrument of State Control, SPUTNIK (Apr. 12,
2011), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110412/163492415.html.
186. Another limitation on Russia’s ability to act is the fact that a not insubstantial
portion of cybercrime comes from Chechen or other ethnic groups. Efforts to combat such
groups may be fraught with ethnic and geo-political tension. On the other hand, Russia’s
invasion of Georgia in 2007 and current occupation of Crimea displays a Russian willingness to
take aggressive action when its national interests or citizens are in jeopardy. Thus, Russia can
be expected to likewise exercise diligence to combat cybercrime stemming from contested or
occupied territory.
187. Daniel Ortner, Note, Conscientious Offenders: Russia’s Ban on ‘Extremist’ Religious
Literature, and the European Court of Human Rights, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming Oct. 2015).
188. Brigitte Hopstad, The Russian Media Under Putin and Medvedev: Controlled Media
in an Authoritarian System (Feb. 2011) (unpublished master’s thesis, Norwegian University of
Science and Technology), available at https://www.academia.edu/979916/The_Russian_me
dia_under_Putin_and_Medvedev_Controlled_media_in_an_authoritarian_system.
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potential harm might be even more serious. Hacking tools in Russia
are freely sold to any that wish to pay. 189 Such technology and
equipment, if not prevented, could easily be used to commit acts of
terrorism or destruction. 190
C. Russia and the Obligation to Prevent Trans-boundary Cybercrime
Having established that Russia would be held to a high standard
of care, it will now be shown that for each of the four categories—
prevention, protection, prosecution, and redress—Russia’s current
efforts fall short.
On a broad level, it is worth noting the Information Security
Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which sets out Russia’s cyber
policies. 191 The doctrine recognizes several flaws in current Russian
cyber-security such as judicial corruption and lack of adequate
laws. 192 Unfortunately, the doctrine is lacking in specific suggestions
and also focuses heavily on controlling information through
censorship and counter-propaganda. 193 Given its vagueness and the
lack of concrete proposals, this doctrine is ill-equipped for dealing
with the growing trans-boundary threat of organized cybercrime.
1. Prevention
Currently, Russia is not exerting due diligence to prevent the
occurrence of cybercrime. One of the problems with Russia’s efforts
to fight cybercrime has been its reactive rather than proactive
nature. 194 Money is spent on surveillance efforts or on attempts to

189. Carlton Purvis, Hacking Tools Fuel Russian Black Market, SECURITY MGMT. (Nov.
7, 2012), http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/hacking-tools-fuel-russian-blackmarket-0010836.
190. Such has happened with traditional military hardware. See Thomas Land, Islamic
Terrorists and the Russian Mafia, 282 CONTEMP. REV. 264 (2003).
191. INFORMATION SECURITY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Approved
Sept. 9, 2000), available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/nsosndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b!
OpenDocument.
192. IAN LEIGH, INFORMATION SECURITY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
available at http://www.dcaf.ch/content/download/36442/528101/file/Doctrine_security_L
EIGH.pdf
193. Id.
194. Indeed, this has been a common criticism of the approach of governments worldwide. See Governments Spend too much on Cyber Surveillance and not Enough on Catching
Crooks, INFO SECURITY, June 18, 2012, available at http://www.infosecurity-
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install anti-virus or anti-phishing tools to the exclusion of efforts to
prevent actual attacks or arrest perpetrators. 195 Yet, cybercrime
experts argue that such an approach is ineffective and far too slow to
respond to the instantaneous nature of cybercrime. 196 Legislation
criminalizing cybercrimes exists; however, as will be mentioned in
the section on prosecutions, penalties may be too low to deter
cybercrime. Existing laws also contain ambiguities that make them
ineffective and inadequate.
Currently, there are no state sponsored agencies conducting
evaluations or assessments of security standards or measuring the
effects of cybercrime. The government has been productively involved
with the qualitative work of security organizations such as GroupIB. 197 Nevertheless, the government should independently seek to
measure and evaluate its progress by conducting impact assessments. 198
International cooperation is another area where greater Russian
effort is needed in order to meet the due diligence requirement of
prevention. As already mentioned, Russia has voiced concerns over
the European Convention on Cybercrime and has been unwilling
to sign in part because of the fear that it will compromise “national
sovereignty.” 199 Russia has at times been reluctant to cooperate with
international extradition efforts. However, this is an area in which
Russia has a special treaty obligation; the Palermo Convention on
Transnational Organized Crime, to which Russia is a signatory,
urges states to “seek to conclude bilateral and multilateral
agreements or arrangements to carry out or enhance the
effectiveness of extradition.” 200
Russia has worked with other nations to combat cybercrime. For
instance, in the case of Viacheslav Ivankov, a high-level individual in
the Russian Mafia, Russian cooperation led to Ivankov’s arrest and
magazine.com/view/26387/governments-spend-too-much-on-cyber-surveillance-and-notenough-on-catching-crooks/.
195. Id.
196. Anti-Virus Software Sucks Up Too Much Security Cash Claims Study, BBC NEWS
(June 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18456607.
197. GROUP IB, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE ‘RUSSIAN’ COMPUTER CRIME MARKET IN
2010, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/hsnnetwork/pdf/russian-cybercrimemarket.pdf.
198. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
199. Putin Defies Convention on Cybercrime, C-NEWS (Mar. 27, 2008)
http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/indexEn.shtml?2008/03/27/293913.
200. Palermo Convention, supra note 111, at art. 16, sub. 17.
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conviction in a U.S. court. 201 Likewise, cybercriminals have been
arrested as a result of transnational cooperation. 202
On the other hand, Russia has been highly critical of American
efforts to extradite Russian citizens.203 Russia also refused to offer
assistance to Estonia following the very costly cyber-attacks that crippled
the state’s cyber infrastructure, even though Estonia submitted a
request for bilateral investigation under the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty (MALT).204 This refusal has been criticized as a violation of both
international norms and Russia’s direct treaty obligations. 205
2. Protection
Russia has taken some steps to facilitate the work of security
agencies. There is currently a website on which individuals can
report cybercrimes which have been committed or are being
planned or prepared. 206 There is also a Federal Security Service
(FSB) e-mail address and phone number for reporting crimes. 207
Russia has also worked to develop new technologies to help
agencies combat cybercrime. 208
However, these efforts do not seem to be highly effective. For
instance, of 900 reported instances of the misuse of
telecommunications networks for extremist or terrorist purposes,
only about 100 of the instances were responded to and stopped. 209
201. Selwyn Raab, Reputed Russian Crime Chief Arrested, N. Y. TIMES, June 9, 1995,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/09/nyregion/reputed-russian-crime-chiefarrested.html.
202. FIGHTING RUSSIAN CYBERCRIME MOBSTERS: REPORT FROM THE TRENCHES,
available at http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa09/ALPEROVITCH/BHUSA09-Alperovitch-RussCybercrime-PAPER.pdf.
203. See Moscow Slams Hacker’s Extradition to U.S., RIA NOVOSTI, (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120119/170850006.html; U.S. Admits Delay in Informing Russia
NOVOSTI
(Jan.
20,
2012),
of
Hacker’s
Extradition,
RIA
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120120/170855620.html.
204. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber-attacks
in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192 (2009), available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss1/7.
205. Id.
206. Committee of Experts on Terrorism, supra note 136.
207. Id.
208. Oscar Williams-Grut, The Lab Fighting Cybercrime: Russia’s Weapon in the War
July
27,
2013,
available
at
Against
Hi-tech
Gangs,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/the-lab-fightingcybercrime-russias-weapon-in-the-war-against-hitech-gangs-8734594.html.
209. Committee of Experts on Terrorism, supra note 129.
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The Federation Council of Russia held a meeting to address gaps in
Russia’s cyber security, and acknowledged the lack of clear incident
response models to respond to cyber incidents. 210 Current security
standards also fall short of recognized best practices. 211
In order to catch individuals involved with organized cybercrime,
Russia should ensure that federal crime fighting organizations such
as the FSB are involved. 212 Doing so is necessary to reduce the
possibility of corruption, which is more prevalent on the regional
level. 213 If efforts are left to the regional police, the high levels of
corruption and mafia penetration are likely to limit prosecution to
merely unaffiliated or rouge individuals. However, because even high
profile individuals working for the Federal Government may be
subject to corruption, 214 it is also important to ensure some level of
redundancy and oversight.
In order to protect against cybercrime, Russia will likely have to
invest more time and resources into training experts. 215 As organized
crime continues to devote more money and energy to hiring highquality information technology specialists, the government will have
to do likewise in order to catch up with organized crime. 216 Likewise,
experts have recommended that Russia increase its training to
“judicial, prosecutorial, investigative, and law enforcement
210. Benjamin Volcsko, Russia Crowdsourcing It’s Cyber Security Strategy: Clever
Experiment or Solicitation of Internet Restriction Freedoms?, MONETARY CYBER SECURITY
INITIATIVE, available at http://sites.miis.edu/cysec/2014/01/20/russias-crowdsourcingexperiment-getting-the-peoples-opinion-on-the-new-cyber-security-strategy/.
211. Id.
212. There is currently legislation pending in the Duma to grant the FSB greater ability
to respond to cybercrime. See Russian Government Calls for FSB to Tackle Cyber Crime, RIA
NOVOSTI (Oct. 17, 2013), http://en.ria.ru/russia/20131017/184204651/RussianGovernment-Calls-for-FSB-to-Tackle-Cyber-Crime.html.
213. The criminalization of the Russian Security Aparatus is well-documented. Stephen
McCombie, Josef Pieprzyk & Paul Watters, Cybercrime Attribution: An Eastern European Case
Study, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH AUSTRALIAN DIGITAL FORENSICS CONFERENCE
(December 3, 2009).
214. An officer of the Russian Interior Ministry’s K Directorate, which investigates
cybercrimes, was arrested and charged with corruption in 2012. Officer of Russian IT
Directorate Arrested, RADIO FREE EUROPE (April 24, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/r
ussian_cybercrime_officer_arrested/24558486.html.
215. See John Leyden, Russian Cops Lack Kit to Fight Cybercrooks, Says Brit Security Buff, THE
REGISTER (June 6, 2013), http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/06/06/private_sector_leading_rus
sian_cybercrime_cleanup/.
216. LOUISE I. SHELLEY, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORISM AND CYBERCRIME, 303–12 (Alan Bryden
& Philipp Fluri eds., 2003), available at http://www.lakeproject.net/download/Germany/Security/Organized%20Crime,%20Terrorism%20and%20Cybercrime.pdf.
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agencies.” 217 Training on the user end should also be a state priority
to help reduce incidents of cybercrime. 218 Currently, no systematic
programs exist to conduct this training.
Involvement of private groups may also be critical in overcoming
cybercrime. In 2003, Group-IB, a public company dedicated to
digital crime investigation and computer forensic consulting, was
established. 219 Since establishment, Group-IB has assisted in the
arrest of several criminals. 220 Since 2012, there was a marked decrease
in some parts of the Russian cybercrime market, in part as a result of
the group’s efforts. 221 Thus, the Russian Government’s involvement
with the efforts of such private organizations to help protect against
cybercrime represents one of the most promising signs of progress.
Nevertheless, current levels of engagement with the private sector on
matters of security remain low, and Russia is overall not doing
enough to protect against cybercrime.
3. Prosecution
Russia’s work with Group-IB to catch cybercriminals is
commendable and seems to signal a shift towards greater efforts at
prevention of cybercrime and prosecution of offenders of such
crimes. 222 However, it is unclear whether these efforts have been
successful in targeting organized crime groups rather than individual
or “rogue” hackers. Russia has also prioritized domestic prosecutions
to the exclusion of those causing harm to persons outside of the
country. As one American cyber security expert explained, Russian
“[h]ackers only really get prosecuted when they attack targets inside
Russia.” 223 Thus, the current legal regime perversely creates an
217. Russian Cybercrime: What Russia is Doing, and What it Should be Doing, INFO
SECURITY (April 24, 2012), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/25359/russiancybercrime-what-russia-is-doing-and-what-it-should-be-doing/.
218. Russia has acknowledged the importance of training citizens as part of its newest
cybersecurity conception/plan. See infra Section VI.
IB,
THREAT
INTELLIGENCE
REPORT
2012–2013,
219. GROUP
http://report2013.group-ib.com/.
220. In 2011, the group reported 10 cybercrime related arrests. Id.
221. Id. On the other hand, increased security, especially in the security sector, has led to
a commensurate rise in spending on infrastructure among cybercrime groups. See Crackdown
on Cybercriminals Equals Reduced Cybercrime in Russia, INFO SECURITY (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/34472/crackdown-on-cybercriminals-equalsreduced-cybercrime-in-russia/.
222. See Lipovsky, supra note 171.
223. Ben Plesser, Skilled, Cheap Russian Hackers Power American Cybercrime, NBC
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incentive for cybercrime groups to focus their efforts on
international rather than domestic targets.
The current penalties for cybercrime are also insufficient to act as
a deterrent. 224 Prior to 2011, those who committed massive transboundary cyber-attacks received light sentences and no jail time; for
instance, two hackers who stole ten million dollars from the Bank of
Scotland received only suspended sentences. 225 This was an especially
glaring discrepancy given that common thieves often receive large
sentences and jail time. 226 In December 2011, the Duma enacted a
criminal code reform, which included aggravated circumstances
leading to an increased penalty. 227 However, expert groups have
criticized these steps as inadequate. 228 In particular, the statute’s
terminology is vague and ill-suited for responding to diverse cyberattacks. 229 Potential profit from cybercrime still outweighs the
potential risk of prosecution. Thus, current prosecutions are likely
inadequate to deter the growth of cybercrime.
4. Redress
Russia has not directly adopted any known compensation
schemes or efforts to assist trans-boundary victims. The Russian
government has cooperated with groups, such as Group-IB, that
specialize in incident response and in helping victims of cyber-attacks
recover data and remove critical vulnerabilities. 230 However there is
no evidence of any such efforts being directed at international
victims of trans-boundary harm.
Russia has also failed to facilitate prosecutions in domestic
courts. While, theoretically foreign nations have equal access to
courts, in reality the court system is notoriously inaccessible to
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/skilled-cheap-russian-hackerspower-american-cybercrime-n22371.
224. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
225. Christopher Williams, Russian Hacker Avoids Jail for $10m Royal Bank of Scotland
Raid, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/831624
6/Russian-hacker-avoids-jail-for-10m-Royal-Bank-of-Scotland-raid.html.
226. Id.
227. Russian Cybercrime: What Russia is Doing, and What It Should be Doing, supra note 217.
228. Id.
229. Russian Cybercrime Market Doubles in Size, HELP NET SECURITY (April 24, 2012),
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=12798.
230. CERT-GIB – COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAM BY GROUP-IB,
http://cert-gib.com/ (last visited September 15, 2014).
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foreigners. 231 Even though Russia’s legal system for enforcing
contracts is ranked tenth in the world, 232 rampant corruption would
make private suits against individuals involved in organized crime
activities especially unlikely to succeed. 233 Getting witnesses to testify
against members of organized crime is difficult because witnesses are
often threatened and intimidated out of testifying. 234 Thus, victims of
trans-boundary cybercrime are likely out of luck in their efforts to
seek compensation in the Russian court system.
In each of the categories, Russia has fallen short of its due
diligence obligation. Current legislation is inadequate to prevent
trans-boundary crime, police efforts are woefully uncoordinated and
ineffective, prosecutions for trans-boundary cybercrime are rare and
riddled with corruption, and victims lack effective avenues of redress.
In order to comply with its obligations, Russia would have to pass
new legislation focused on cybercrime and vigorously enforce it.
VII. CONCLUSION: FAILURE, BUT A SIGN FOR HOPE
Yet, despite its current failings, there are signs that Russia is
starting to acknowledge the importance of aggressively targeting
cybercrime. In 2013, the Russian Federal Council organized an
investigation into potential proposals to improve cyber security. In
January 2014, the group put out a draft proposal that a governmental
working group will review in an effort to craft legislation. 235 These
proposals would, if completely adopted and enforced, likely meet

231. Charles Clover, Russian Court Move Seen as Power Grab, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 4,
2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ea1bd9ac-3a0f-11e2-a00d-00144feabdc0.html.
232. International Finance Corporation, Ease of Doing Business in Russian Federation,
WORLD BANK Group, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/#enfor
cing-contracts.
233. Firestone, supra note 153.
234. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Russia: Measures Implemented to Fight
Police Corruption, including the Procedure for Filing a Complaint against the Police; the Witness
REFWORLD
(Nov.
8,
2011),
Protection
Program,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5072b3af2.html.
235. CONCEPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF CYBERSECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(in Russian) [hereinafter CONCEPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF CYBERSECURITY], available at
http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d4b3dfbdb25cea8a73.pdf (author’s translation). For
some public commentary critical of the plan, see Атаманова Г.А., Conception of the Strategy of
Cybersecurity
of
the
Russian
Federation,
АГАСОФИЯ
(March
17,
2104),
http://gatamanov.blogspot.com/2014/03/blog-post_17.html [Russian blog post].
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Russia’s due diligence obligations. The proposal addresses aspects of
prevention, protection, prosecution and redress. 236
A. Prevention
The document openly acknowledges existing gaps and seeks to
increase the Russian Federation’s role in cyber-security on an equal
level with regional and private efforts. 237 The document calls for the
systematizing of efforts and for much needed centralized
coordination. 238 The government is called to work with local
governments, businesses and civilian organizations in order to
achieve its goals. 239 Specifically, the proposal calls for greater
government interaction with the private sector including helping
private companies develop better security practices. 240 Citizens would
also be encouraged to propose solutions to security problems. 241 In
order to encourage private involvement, the plan calls for tax
subsidies and other government aid. It also calls for regular
evaluations of the systems. In addition, scientific studies to analyze
and research cyber security are encouraged.
The plan calls for improved legislation on cyber-security
including the adaptation of international legal norms and full
compliance with ratified international agreements. 242 In order to
measure progress, the document recommends the development of
new information security systems as well as criteria to evaluate the
effectiveness of such systems. 243
The plan also calls for the growth in international cooperation
especially in regard to limiting the spread and use of “information
weapons.” 244 Additionally, it calls for greater interaction and
information sharing between domestic and international commercial

236. Encouragingly, one “basic principle” of the plan includes free and equal access to
information and knowledge. CONCEPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF CYBERSECURITY supra note
235 at III. 4, 3). In addition the plan mentions the need to avoid the extremes of a complete
lack of security on the one hand and excessive regulation on the other. Id. at V 4).
237. Id. at III 1)–2).
238. Id. at VI 1).
239. Id. at III 3).
240. Id. at VI 4)–5).
241. Id. at VII 6).
242. Id. at VII 1)–2).
243. Id. at III 2).
244. Id. at III 2).
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and corporate organizations. 245 The plan likewise mentions the need
for greater cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies. 246
Finally, the plan does call for the development of agreements and
mechanisms to improve global cyber-security as well as a
harmonization of security standards. 247
Thus, the proposal is quite thorough in the area of prevention. It
would improve international cooperation, data collection, and
cooperation between state and non-state actors. 248 Such efforts
would almost certainly be sufficient to satisfy due diligence.
B. Protection 249
Importantly, the plan emphasizes that security efforts should
be prioritized to focus on the most serious and likely threats to
cyber security. 250 Such a priority, if implemented, would minimize
many of the problems already discussed, such as the state focusing
on small time criminals rather than those most heavily involved in
organized cybercrime.
In addition, the proposal calls for a uniform system of
technological training, as well as a one-stop portal where members of
the public can go for cyber-security tools as well as information and
statistics about cybercrimes. 251 The government would also seek to
establish a national center to warn of cyber-threats. 252
There is also a general call to increase the cyber-literacy of
Russian citizens through a “wide spread information campaign.” 253
University classes should be developed for all levels dealing with
cyber issues. 254 For civil servants, knowledge of technology and cyber
security would become required, and regular training would be
conducted to ensure that their training remains current. 255

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id at III 6).
Id. at VII 2).
Id. at VII 1).
Id. at III 6).
Id.
Id. at V 5)
Id. at III 2.
Id. at VI 1), VII at 5).
Id. at III 5), VII at 7).
Id. at VII 5).
Id.
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The efforts at protection are also quite sweeping as they would
include training of law enforcement personnel and the general
public, as well as a focus on the most serious cybercrimes. 256 Such
efforts would likely be sufficient to satisfy due diligence.
C. Prosecution 257
Of all of the areas, the plan focuses the least on increasing
prosecutions. Nevertheless, the plan calls for increased penalties for
crimes as well as penalty enhancements for traditional crimes
committed with the help of cyber technology. 258 If Russia
implemented and enforced these enhanced penalties with a focus on
the most serious and likely threats rather than small-time criminals, it
could meet its due diligence obligation to prosecute. However, this is
the one area where additional measures might be required to ensure
that those most involved with organized cybercrime are prosecuted.
Regardless, the proposal would be an enormous step forward.
D. Redress 259
Redress is also not the primary focus of the plan. However, the
plan calls for the development of incident response centers to
detect, prevent, and eliminate the effects of cyber-attacks. 260 In
addition, the government would work with insurance companies to
provide risk insurance against cybercrime as well as legal
assistance. 261 It is not entirely clear whether this aid would be
offered to foreign companies and others injured by trans-boundary
harm. However, an insurance-based model, possibly subsidized,
might be an elegant and novel solution that offers aid to
transnational corporations or other injured entities. 262

256. Id. at VII 5).
257. Id.
258. Id. at VII 2).
259. Id.
260. Id. at VII 1).
261. Id. at VII 6).
262. Of course, an insurance-based model might create perverse incentives, as the
Russian mafia is already heavily involved with insurance fraud and insurance related schemes.
Thus, an insurance-based scheme might create an incentive for the Mafia to aggressively sell
cyber-insurance and perpetuate attacks to scare businesses into making these purchases.
Without adequate prosecution and deterrence, focusing on providing insurance is likely to
bolster rather than stymie the Russian Mafia’s conduct. See Jeffrey R. Hatcher, The Russian
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The provisions of this plan are laudable and, if implemented,
would likely be sufficient to ensure that Russia is in compliance with
its international obligation of due diligence. This would be
dependent on vigorous enforcement of the proposal as well as its
application in a non-discriminatory fashion towards international
organizations. It is entirely possible that such protocols would be
enforced in such a way to only deter cybercrime against domestic
organizations, which would actually provide an incentive for transboundary cybercrime. Nevertheless, it seems that internal cybersecurity protocols are a necessary first step towards addressing the
problem of trans-boundary harm.
The Russian Government must now first approve the proposal.
After approval, a working group comprised of members of the
Security Council of the Russian Federation and other federal bodies,
as well as representatives from public and private groups working on
cyber issues, would be organized to develop specific protocols for the
implementation of the plan. 263
Until such norms are ratified and implemented, Russia will
continue to fail in its international obligation to exercise due
diligence in the prevention, protection, prosecution and redress of
international trans-boundary cybercrime.

Daniel Ortner264

Mafia and Its Impact on the Russian Economy, 7 THE MONITOR: J. INT’L STUD. (2000),
available at http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/07-1/4-hatcher.htm.
263. Russia has already engaged in laudable public outreach including broadcasting
television programs focusing on the new plan. See Benjamin Volcsko, Russia Crowdsourcing It’s
Cyber Security Strategy: Clever Experiment or Solicitation of Internet Restriction Freedoms?,
MIIS CYSEC (Jan 20, 2014), http://sites.miis.edu/cysec/2014/01/20/russiascrowdsourcing-experiment-getting-the-peoples-opinion-on-the-new-cyber-security-strategy/.
264. Law Clerk for Justice Thomas R. Lee, Utah Supreme Court. I would like to thank
Professor Eric Jensen for his tireless assistance on this article.
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